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The fall of 2008 now stands as a dark memory of the effects of unregulated,
non-transparent, risky financial instruments. Investors lost trillions of dollars in
the U.S. stock market as panic set in after the collapse of Lehman Brothers,1 one
of the oldest and most respected investment banks on Wall Street, and the near
collapse of American International Group (AIG).2 Lehman and AIG, like many
other financial entities prior to the 2008 recession, entered into unregulated overthe-counter (OTC) derivative contracts linked to sub-prime mortgage-backed
securities.3 Upon the unthinkable collapse of the U.S. housing market, payment
on certain derivative contracts, such as credit default swaps, were triggered.4
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1. See Henry C. K. Liu, The Crisis of Wealth Destruction, ROOSEVELT INST. (Apr. 7, 2010),
http://www.rooseveltinstitute.org/new-roosevelt/crisis-wealth-destruction (recounting that U.S.
households lost almost $8 trillion of wealth in the stock market, and that the financial crisis
destroyed $34.4 trillion of global wealth).
2. See Stephen Foley, Crash! Shares Tumble as Lehman Collapses and Fears Grow for AIG,
INDEPENDENT (Sept. 16, 2008), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/crash-sharestumble-as-lehman-brothers-collapses-and-fears-grow-for-aig-931981.html (explaining that “as
panic selling spread during the afternoon [of the first trading day following Lehman Brothers’
declaration of bankruptcy] on Wall Street, the Dow Jones Industrial Average of leading US shares
ended down over 500 points”).
3. See The Origins of the Financial Crisis, ECONOMIST (Sept. 7, 2013), http://www.
economist.com/news/schoolsbrief/21584534-effects-financial-crisis-are-still-being-felt-five-year
s-article (describing how “[c]omplex chains of debt . . . such as credit default swaps” created
concentrated risk).
4. THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC
CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES xxv (Jan. 2011), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPOFCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf (stating that “[w]hen the housing bubble popped and crisis followed,
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However, counterparties were vastly undercapitalized and unable to pay the
enormous amounts due.5 The U.S. government stepped in to curb the spiraling
trend of defaults on these contracts by lending billions in taxpayer dollars.6
The fallout following the collapse of the U.S. housing market reverberated
around the world, igniting a global financial crisis.7 The economic contagion
spread, prompting many international governments to intervene and rescue
institutions that bought U.S. sub-prime mortgage-backed securities and other
unregulated derivative contracts.8 OTC derivatives operated in a completely
opaque market, which was the result of decades of a “free market” regulatory
philosophy embraced by policymakers. 9 Only after an economic event so
devastating that it rivaled the Great Depression did Congress seek to impose
regulation.10
In 2009, the world’s leaders convened at the G20 Summit in Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania, committed to bringing transparency to the OTC derivatives
market through global cooperation.11 In 2010, Congress responded by passing
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which
adopted many of the principles agreed upon at the 2009 G20 summit.12 The
Dodd-Frank Act mandates both the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
derivatives were in the center of the storm”). Under a credit default swap, payment is triggered
whenever a credit event, such as a partial default on a mortgage, occurs. See id. at 50.
5. See id. (explaining that because credit default swaps were not regulated as either insurance
contracts or OTC derivatives, counterparties were not required to provide any initial collateral or
set aside capital to absorb any potential losses).
6. See Matthew Karnitschnig et al., U.S. To Take Over AIG in $85 Billion Bailout; Central
Banks Inject Cash as Credit Dries Up, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 16, 2008, 11:59 PM), http://online.
wsj.com/articles/SB122156561931242905 (explaining that the Federal Reserve would lend $85
billion in taxpayer dollars and in return receive a 79.9% equity stake in the company). Former
Chairman of AIG, Maurice Greenberg, later brought suit against the Government alleging that it
had no authority to require an equity stake as collateral for the loan. See Starr Int’l Co. v. United
States, 121 Fed. Cl. 428, 475 (2015) (holding that while the Government acted illegally,
shareholders were not harmed by the Government’s action).
7. See The Origins of the Financial Crisis, supra note 3.
8. See id.
9. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Turning a Blind Eye: Why Washington Keeps Giving in to
Wall Street, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283, 1420–25 (2013).
10. Pedro Nicolaci Da Costa, Bernanke: 2008 Meltdown Was Worse Than Great Depression,
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 26, 2014, 4:03 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2014/08/26/2008meltdown-was-worse-than-great-depression-bernanke-says/.
11. See G-20 Leaders’ Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit, preamble para. 17 (Sept. 24–25,
2009),
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/g7-g20/Documents/pittsburgh_
summit_leaders_statement_250909.pdf.
12. See Jacek Kubas, G20 Deadline on OTC Derivatives—Where Are We Now?, (May 30,
2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (stating the deadline for implementing the
G20 commitments was the end of 2012 and may have been too ambitious); see also FIN. STABILITY
BD., OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET REFORMS: EIGHTH PROGRESS REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION 1
(Nov. 7, 2014), http://www.financialstability board.org/wp-content/uploads/8th-OTC-derivativesprogress-report-for-publication-7Nov.pdf (noting that the “implementation of detailed regulations
varies across jurisdictions” and “timetables stretch well into 2015 and beyond”).
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(CFTC) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to consult and
coordinate with domestic and foreign regulators in promulgating rules affecting
OTC derivatives.13
In addition to the Dodd-Frank Act, the Secretary General of the International
Organization of Securities Commissions called for a uniform global regulatory
regime for OTC derivatives.14 The CFTC and SEC proposed a framework of
“substituted compliance” as a first step in achieving global cooperation.15 Given
the interconnectedness of the derivatives market, the CFTC and SEC will allow
a market participant, otherwise subject to rules under Dodd-Frank in a crossborder derivatives transaction, to substitute compliance with its home country’s
financial regulatory regime. 16 The European Union has adopted similar
proposals.17 Ensuring uniformity of data and compatible reporting requirements
will be central to the success of global coordination in OTC derivative reform.
This Comment will analyze both the United States and the European Union
approaches to OTC derivatives regulation and propose a solution to making
substituted compliance determinations in a global regulatory framework. Part I
of this Comment surveys the history of derivatives regulation in the United
States, highlights swaps as the type of derivative targeted by global regulators,
and discusses current rulemaking efforts by the CFTC, SEC, and European
Commission. Part II of this Comment then analyzes these current rulemaking
efforts by comparing and contrasting the regulatory agencies’ respective
approaches. This Comment concludes with a proposal highlighting the
importance of uniform data identifiers in swap trade reporting when making
substituted compliance determinations regarding OTC derivatives regulations.

13. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §
752(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1749 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8325 (2012)).
14. David Wright, Sec’y Gen. of IOSCO, Remarks at the Atlantic Council in Washington,
D.C. (Dec. 10, 2012), http://www.iosco.org/library/speeches/pdf/20121210-Wright-David.pdf.
15. See Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance With Certain
Swap Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. 45,292, 45,340 (July 26, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. ch. 1)
[hereinafter Interpretive Guidance]; see also Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities, 78 Fed.
Reg. 30,968, 30,975 (May 23, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242, and 249) [hereinafter
Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities]. The concept of “substituted compliance” was first
developed by Ethiopis Tafara and Robert J. Peterson. See generally Ethiopis Tafara & Robert J.
Peterson, A Blueprint for Cross-Border Access to United States Investors: A New International
Framework, 48 HARV. INT’L L. J. 31, 32, 67–68 (2007).
16. See Interpretive Guidance, 78 Fed. Reg. at 45,342–43; see also Cross-Border SecurityBased Swap Activities, 78 Fed. Reg. at 31,094–95.
17. See generally Regulation (EU) 648/2012, 2012 O.J. (L 201) 1 (commonly referred to as
the “European Market Infrastructure Regulation” or “EMIR”); Directive 2014/65/EU, 2014 O.J. (L
173) 349 (commonly referred to as the “Markets in Financial Instruments Directive” or “MiFID
II”); Regulation (EU) 600/2014, 2014 O.J. (L 173) 84 (commonly referred to as the “Markets in
Financial Instruments Regulation” or “MiFIR”); Directive 2014/57/EU, 2014 O.J. (L 173) 179
(commonly referred to as the “Market Abuse Directive”).
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I. A HISTORY OF DERIVATIVES REGULATION, SUBSEQUENT DEREGULATORY
EFFORTS, AND THE REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL
CRISIS
A. What Is a Derivative? Grain Futures as an Early Example
Although many scholars disagree on the exact definition, 18 a derivative is
most commonly understood as a “financial instrument whose value depends on
or is derived from the performance of a secondary source such as an underlying
bond, currency, or commodity.”19 The earliest use of derivatives in the United
States can be traced back to nineteenth century agricultural futures trading.20
Grain and other commodities were transported by Midwestern farmers to
Chicago where they were sold to merchants and stored for later shipment to large
cities in the East.21 Due to the boom and bust nature of the grain-harvesting
season, coupled with the complications inherent in storing perishable goods,
farmers and merchants used futures contracts to mitigate storage costs and hedge
against price risks.22 The farmer and merchant would agree on a fixed price in
early summer for the future delivery of grain after the fall harvest. 23 These
futures contracts enabled the farmer and the merchant to lock-in the price of
grain prior to delivery.24 Almost immediately, futures contracts began trading
on the Chicago Board of Trade, a newly-created futures exchange.25

18. See RAFFAELE SCALCIONE, THE DERIVATIVES REVOLUTION:
AND A BLUEPRINT FOR REGULATORY REFORM 130 (2011).

A TRAPPED INNOVATION

19. Derivative, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 509 (9th ed. 2009); see also Procter & Gamble
Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 925 F.Supp. 1270, 1275 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (stating that “[d]erivatives
transactions may be based on the value of foreign currency, U.S. Treasury bonds, stock indexes, or
interest rates. The values of these underlying financial instruments are determined by market
forces, such as movements in interest rates. Within the broad panoply of derivatives transactions
are numerous innovative financial instruments whose objectives may include a hedge against
market risks, management of assets and liabilities, or lowering of funding costs; derivatives may
also be used as speculation for profit”).
20. See JAMES HAMILTON ET AL., A GUIDE TO FEDERAL REGULATION OF DERIVATIVES 13
(Mary Tonah ed. 1998) (explaining that agricultural futures trading “developed in response to the
economic need for centralized pricing and large-scale risk bearing”).
21. See R. STAFFORD JOHNSON, EQUITY MARKETS AND PORTFOLIO ANALYSIS 623 (2014).
22. See id.
23. See id.; see also Futures Contract, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 746 (9th ed. 2009)
(defining a futures contract as “[a]n agreement to buy or sell a standardized asset (such as a
commodity, stock, or foreign currency) at a fixed price at a future time”).
24. See JOHNSON, supra note 21, at 623.
25. See Timeline of CME Achievements, CME GROUP, http://www.cmegroup.com/
company/history/timeline-of-achievements.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2016).
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B. Exchange-Traded vs. OTC Derivative Contracts: What Is the Difference?
Derivative contracts occur generally in two forms: exchange-traded or OTC.26
Exchange-traded derivatives are highly standardized contracts with little room
for customization.27 Typically in exchange-traded derivatives, a buyer has only
the power to determine the underlying asset, the settlement amount, the maturity
date, and the strike price.28 Additionally, by virtue of trading on an exchange,
counterparties to a contract interact with an intermediary (i.e., a clearinghouse29)
that provides order execution, 30 trade clearing, 31 trade settlement, and credit
support, among other services. 32 A futures contract is one example of an
exchange-traded derivative.33
In contrast, OTC derivatives are bilateral contracts negotiated by the parties
in private and without the use of an intermediary. 34 Unlike the standardized
nature of exchange-traded derivatives, the permutations in terms of OTC
derivative contracts are infinite. 35 Because there is no clearinghouse,
counterparties to an OTC derivative contract are subject to ongoing credit risk
and do not have the benefit of third party monitoring.36 OTC derivatives operate
in a largely non-transparent market because the transaction is not reported to any
exchange.37 Swaps are an example of an OTC derivative.38

26. See Sean J. Griffith, Substituted Compliance and Systemic Risk: How To Make a Global
Market in Derivatives Regulation, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1291, 1297 (2014).
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See Clearing House, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/clearing
house.asp (last visited Jan. 30, 2016) (defining a clearinghouse as “[a]n agency or separate
corporation of a futures exchange . . . [that] act[s] as [a] third part[y] to all futures and options
contracts—as a buyer to every clearing member seller and a seller to every clearing member
buyer”).
30. See Execution, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/execution.asp (last
visited Jan. 30, 2016) (defining “execution” as “[t]he completion of a buy or sell order for a
security”).
31. See Clearing, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/clearing.asp (last
visited Jan. 30, 2016) (defining “clearing” as “[t]he procedure by which an organization acts as an
intermediary and assumes the role of a buyer and seller for transactions in order to reconcile orders
between transacting parties”).
32. See Griffith, supra note 26, at 1297.
33. See supra notes 20–25 and accompanying text.
34. See Griffith, supra note 26, at 1298.
35. See id.
36. See id.; see also JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIES REGULATION 25–
26 (12th ed. 2012) (explaining that “[t]he purpose of requiring a clearinghouse is that it eliminates
the credit party risk for each participant because the clearinghouse would assume financial
responsibility for the transaction if either party became insolvent or defaulted”).
37. See COFFEE, JR. & SALE, supra note 36, at 25.
38. See Product Descriptions and Frequently Asked Questions, INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES
ASS’N, INC., http://www.isda.org/educat/faqs.html#10 (last visited Jan. 30, 2016).
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C. Bilateral OTC Derivatives and the Credit Default Swap: Ushering in a
Wave of Financial Innovation and Transfer of Risk
Generally, a swap is a type of derivative in which counterparties to a bilateral
contract agree to exchange cash flows at specified intervals for an agreed-upon
amount of time.39 There are five major swap asset classes: interest rates, credit,
equities, commodities, and foreign exchange. 40 One of the earliest reported
swaps was a currency, or foreign exchange, swap between I.B.M. and the World
Bank in 1981. 41 In the mid-1990s, J.P. Morgan pioneered what are now
considered credit default swaps in a landmark deal by selling the credit risk of a
five billion dollar loan to the European Bank of Reconstruction and
Development.42
Observers cite credit default swaps as the primary “culprit” of the 2008
financial crisis.43 As such, credit default swaps have been the focus of recent
regulatory reforms. 44 A credit default swap offers parties a method of
transferring risk. 45 One party is the “protection buyer,” and the other is the
“protection seller.”46 The buyer pays the seller a fee to secure protection of any
loss sustained by the buyer in the event of a default on the underlying “reference
entity.”47 Counterparties in a credit default swap are exposed to two types of
risk.48 One is the risk of the change in value of the underlying reference entity

39. See id.
40. Asset Classes, INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, INC., http://www2.isda.org/assetclasses/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2016).
41. John Lanchester, Outsmarted, NEW YORKER (Jun. 1, 2009), http://www.newyorker.
com/magazine/2009/06/01/ (explaining that the swap “allowed I.B.M. to trade surplus Swiss francs
and Deutsche marks for dollars held by the World Bank” and that it “ushered in a whole new field
of finance”).
42. See id. In 1994, Exxon, a long-time client of J.P. Morgan, applied for a $5 billion line of
credit to cover potential punitive damages claims from the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill. See id.
Blythe Masters, a banker with J.P. Morgan, conceptualized selling the credit risk to another bank
(the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development) for a fee to free J.P. Morgan from holding
a large capital reserve against the risk of the loan. See id.
43. See, e.g., Adam Davidson, How AIG Fell Apart, REUTERS (Sept. 18, 2008), http://
www.reuters.com/article/2008/09/18/us-how-aig-fell-apart-idUSMAR85972720080918.
44. Houman B. Shadab, Credit Default Swaps and Regulatory Reform, MERCATUS
CTR. 3 (Aug. 2009), http://mercatus.org/publication/credit-default-swaps-and-regulatory-reform
(describing a reform proposal by the U.S. Treasury Department that “seeks to increase the stability
and transparency of the CDS market”).
45. See Griffith, supra note 26, at 1298–99 (explaining that a swap transfers the risk of
fluctuating interest rates from one party to another because the parties predetermine which party
pays the other when interest rates rise or fall).
46. See id. at 1299.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 1300. Generally, all swaps, not just credit default swaps, are subject to this type
of risk. See COFFEE, JR. & SALE, supra note 36, at 25 (stating that “because trading in swaps is
conducted with a counterparty, rather than a centralized market, each participant faces a credit risk
as well as a market risk”).
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or asset causing one party to make payments to the other.49 The other risk is the
possibility of a counterparty not performing under the contract and thus being
unable to make payments. 50 In the case of non-performance, the party that
sought to transfer the risk is now the principle bearer.51
D. History of Derivatives Regulation in the United States
1. Early Attempts and Constitutional Challenges to Federal Regulation
In June 1864, Congress first attempted to regulate derivatives52 with an act to
prohibit gold futures trading.53 The regulation, however, was short-lived and
repealed two weeks later after Congress concluded the Act precipitated a sharp
drop in the value of currency.54 Congress would not pass additional regulation
until August 1921 when it enacted The Future Trading Act.55 This regulation,
again, would be short lived, but not due to any perceived unintended
consequences; rather as a result of a successful constitutional challenge brought
by members of the Chicago Board of Trade.56 The Supreme Court held that the
grain futures contracts at issue concerned solely matters of intrastate commerce,
and Congress had therefore overstepped its bounds by attempting to regulate
commerce that was not interstate.57

49. See Griffith, supra note 26, at 1300.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See generally, Jeremy Gogel, “Shifting Risk to the Dumbest Guy in the Room”—
Derivatives Regulation After the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 11 J. BUS. &
SEC. L. 1, 13 (2010) (providing a history of derivatives regulation, including the Anti-Gold Futures
Act, Congress’s first attempt to regulate transactions involving gold, which came about due to the
perception that the lack of private market regulation resulted in the wide discrepancy between gold
and “greenbacks” trading).
53. Ch. 127, 13 Stat. 132 (1864) (repealed 1864). Alan Greenspan remarked at a conference
in 1997 that the Act was passed in response to the significant discount at which the Union’s fiat
currency—known as the greenback—was trading relative to gold. Alan Greenspan, Chairman of
the Fed. Reserve Bd., Remarks at the Financial Markets Conference of the Federal Reserve Bank
of Atlanta: Government Regulation and Derivative Contracts (Feb. 21, 1997) (transcript available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/BoardDocs/Speeches/1997/19970221.htm)
[hereinafter
Greenspan].
54. Ch. 209, 13 Stat. 132 (1864); see also Greenspan, supra note 53.
55. Future Trading Act, ch. 86, 42 Stat. 187 (1921), invalidated by Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S.
44, 68–70 (1922).
56. See Hill, 259 U.S. at 68–70 (holding that the Act was an unconstitutional exercise of
Congress’s taxing power and the grain futures contracts at issue were matters of intrastate
commerce). Chief Justice William Howard Taft, writing for the majority, stated that “sales for
future delivery on the Board of Trade are not in and of themselves interstate commerce. They
cannot come within the regulatory power of Congress as such, unless they are regarded by Congress
. . . as directly interfering with interstate commerce . . . .” Id. at 69.
57. Id. at 69–70.
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Shortly after the Supreme Court invalidated the Future Trading Act, Congress
reacted by passing the Grain Futures Act in September 1922.58 Guided by its
recent defeat in court, Congress stated that the purpose of the Act was “[f]or the
prevention and removal of obstructions and burdens upon interstate commerce
in grain, by regulating transactions on grain futures exchanges.”59 The 1922 Act
was challenged similarly as unconstitutional.60 The Court, however, upheld the
Grain Futures Act stating:
In the act we are considering, Congress has expressly declared that
transactions and prices of grain in dealing in futures are susceptible to
speculation, manipulation, and control which are detrimental to the
producer and consumer and persons handling grain in interstate
commerce and render regulation imperative for the protection of such
commerce and the national public interest therein.61
The Grain Futures Act of 1922 created and vested implementation authority
in a commission within the Department of Agriculture.62 In effect, the Grain
Futures Act laid the regulatory foundation for current derivatives regulation and
the modern-day Commodity Futures Trading Commission.63
In June 1936, Congress sought to further expand oversight and regulation by
amending and renaming the Grain Futures Act of 1922 to the Commodity
Exchange Act. 64 The Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) of 1936 imposed
several new regulations on brokers, market participants, and exchanges.65 One
of the CEA’s hallmark requirements was that all futures contracts be traded on
a regulated exchange.66 The CEA, further, extended jurisdiction to regulate not
only grain futures, but also futures on other agricultural commodities.67 While
the Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934, at the time

58. See Grain Futures Act, ch. 369, 42 Stat. 998 (1922).
59. Id.
60. See Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 32–33 (1923).
61. Id. at 37. The Court also noted that “[t]he Grain Futures Act which is now before us
differs from the Future Trading Act in having the very features the absence of which we held . . .
prevented our sustaining the Future Trading Act.” Id. at 32.
62. Grain Futures Act, ch. 369, 42 Stat. 998.
63. See Greenspan, supra note 53 (noting that the Grain Futures Act created a regulatory
framework for derivatives as it “made it unlawful to trade futures on exchanges other than those
designated as contract markets by the Secretary of Agriculture”).
64. Commodity Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 673, ch. 545, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936).
65. See Gogel, supra note 52, at 18–19.
66. See Michael Greenberger, Overwhelming a Financial Regulatory Black Hole with
Legislative Sunlight: Dodd-Frank’s Attack on Systemic Economic Destabilization Caused by an
Unregulated Multi-Trillion Dollar Derivatives Market, 6 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 127, 129–30 (2011);
see also 7 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2012).
67. See Gogel, supra note 52, at 19; see also Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1940)
(defining “commodity” to include, among other things, “cotton, rice, corn, oats, barley, rye,
flaxseed, grain sorghums, mill feeds, butter, eggs . . . and soybean meal”).
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recently enacted, did not regulate derivatives,68 the framework of the CEA was
substantially similar to securities markets regulation.69
2. Expansion of Futures Markets To Include Financial Interests
By 1974, several shadow futures markets emerged that were trading
unregulated commodities such as coffee, sugar, cocoa, various metals, and
foreign currencies.70 At the time, there was some indication that futures markets
would soon expand into goods and services, including home mortgages. 71
Congress responded by significantly amending the CEA to further expand its
regulatory jurisdiction to include futures contracts of non-agricultural
commodities. 72 The definition of commodity was once again expanded to
include not only specified agricultural products, but also “all other ‘goods and
articles . . . and all services, rights, and interests in which contracts for future
delivery are presently or in the future dealt in.’”73
In 1974, moreover, the value of futures trading reached the approximate value
of securities trading—almost $500 billion annually.74 To oversee this vast and
rapidly growing market, Congress established a new, independent regulatory
agency—the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).75 In doing so,
Congress removed the authority of the commodity exchange agency previously
within the Department of Agriculture and instead vested the CFTC with
“exclusive jurisdiction over financial futures and options on certain financial
interests,” including newly developed stock index futures. 76 The 1974
amendments to the CEA, Alan Greenspan observed, were “[i]n one respect . . .
sweeping deregulation, in that it explicitly allowed the trading on futures

68. See David B. Esau, Joint Regulation of Single Stock Futures: Cause or Result of
Regulatory Arbitrage and Interagency Turf Wars?, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 917, 919–20 (2002)
(noting that the Securities Act of 1933 focused on information disclosure as the “first step in this
process” and that the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 focused on regulating other securities such
as stock exchanges).
69. See Greenberger, supra note 66, at 131 (explaining that “futures contracts were required
to be traded on publicly transparent and fully regulated exchanges supported by clearing
mechanisms that ensured that contractual commitments would be backed by adequate capital”).
70. See HAMILTON ET AL., supra note 20, at 14.
71. See id. at 15.
72. See Gogel, supra note 52, at 22 (citing Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, § 201, 88 Stat. 1389 (1974)).
73. EDWARD F. GREEN ET AL., U.S. REGULATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES AND
DERIVATIVES MARKETS § 12.08 (11th ed. 2015) (citing the Commodity Exchange Act of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-463, § 9(b)–(c), 88 Stat. 1389 (1974) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1976)).
74. See HAMILTON ET AL., supra note 20, at 15.
75. See GREEN ET AL., supra note 73 (referencing 7 U.S.C. § 4a (1976) (addressing the
establishment of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission)).
76. See id.; see also Gogel, supra note 52, at 22 (citing the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (1974) (previously codified at 7 U.S.C.
§ 4(a) (1976)).
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exchanges of contracts on virtually any underlying assets, including financial
instruments.”77
The 1974 amendments to the CEA also included the so-called “Treasury
Amendment,” which excluded foreign currencies and certain specified financial
instruments (including government securities or mortgages and mortgage
purchase commitments) from the jurisdiction of the CFTC if they were traded
off-exchange.78 The apparent rationale behind the Treasury Amendment was
that market participants engaging in this kind of activity were most likely to be
banks and other financial institutions and therefore did not need the protection
of the CEA. 79 However, the Treasury Amendment failed to anticipate and
protect subsequent innovative derivative contracts such as swaps. 80 What
resulted was legal uncertainty about whether certain privately negotiated
derivatives contracts were illegally traded off-exchange since they did not fit the
definition of contracts specified in the Treasury Amendment.81
3. Jurisdictional Conflict over Security Futures and Subsequent Regulation
Designed To Provide Legal Certainty
Following the 1974 amendments to the CEA, the Securities and Exchange
Commission, disputing the breadth of the CFTC’s exclusive jurisdiction,
claimed certain futures contracts qualified as “securities” as defined in the
Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.82 The chairmen
77. See Greenspan, supra note 53.
78. See GREEN ET AL., supra note 73. The amendments provided that:
Nothing in this chapter shall be deemed to govern or in any way be applicable to
transactions in foreign currency, security warrants, security rights, resales of installment
loan contracts, repurchase options, government securities, or mortgages and mortgage
purchase commitments, unless such transactions involve the sale thereof for future
delivery conducted on a board of trade.
7 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
79. See Greenspan, supra note 53 (stating, in 1997, that there is “no reason to presume that
the regulatory framework of the CEA needs to be applied to the foreign exchange markets to
achieve the public policy objectives that motivated the CEA”); but see Chad Bray et al., Big Banks
Are Fined $4.25 Billion in Inquiry into Currency-Rigging, N.Y TIMES (Nov. 12, 2014, 2:24 AM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/11/12/british-and-u-s-regulators-fine-big-banks-3-16-billionin-foreign-exchange-scandal/?_r=0 (detailing a massive foreign exchange rate fixing scandal
among traders at the world’s largest banks).
80. See Greenspan, supra note 53. The International Swaps and Derivatives Association
defines a “swap” as “a bilateral agreement to exchange cash flows at specified intervals (payment
dates) during the agreed-upon life of the transaction.” Product Descriptions and Frequently Asked
Questions, INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASSOC., http://www.isda.org/educat/faqs.html#10 (last
visited Oct. 9, 2015).
81. See Greenspan, supra note 53; see also GREEN ET AL, supra note 73, at § 12.09, n.183.
82. GREEN ET AL., supra note 73, at § 12.09; see, e.g., SEC v. Univest, Inc., 410 F.Supp. 1029,
1030–31 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (holding that promissory notes issued by the company to customers in an
effort to liquidate its business debts were not “securities” within the meaning of the federal security
laws, but rather “agreements” within the meaning of Section 2 of the CEA, and therefore subject to
the CFTC’s exclusive jurisdiction).
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of the CFTC and SEC met in 1981 to discuss their respective positions on
jurisdiction and reached an agreement known as the Shad-Johnson Accord.83
The Accord established that the SEC retained exclusive jurisdiction over
security-based options contracts, and the CFTC retained exclusive jurisdiction
over options on all commodities that were not securities and futures contracts on
broad-based security indices.84 The Accord also established a prohibition on
futures contracts and options on futures contracts of a single security or a
narrow-based security index (i.e., neither the CFTC nor SEC were granted
authority to authorize such contracts to trade).85
The Accord failed, however, to completely settle the disputes between the
CFTC and SEC.86 As innovative derivative contracts exhibiting characteristics
of both a security and a futures contract increased prevalence in the market, the
jurisdictional battle returned. 87 One such product is the interest rate swap.
Similar to a traditional futures contract—where the buyer and seller agree to a
fixed price (payable at present) of a future rate—an interest rate swap is
essentially a “‘swapping’ of commitments, with one party buying the fixed rate
and selling the floating rate, while the other party is buying the floating rate and
selling the fixed rate.” 88 The CFTC, recognizing that swaps, like futures
contracts, might be subject to the mandatory exchange-trading requirement of
the CEA, issued a policy statement in 1989 exempting swaps from the
requirement.89 However, the CEA did not permit or otherwise authorize the
CFTC to issue such an exemption. 90 As such, Congress enacted the Futures
Trading Practices Act of 1992 to legitimize the CFTC’s actions and provide
greater legal certainty regarding swaps.91
While the Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992 did not resolve the ongoing
jurisdictional issues between the CFTC and SEC, it did provide practical relief
83. See Pub. L. No. 97-303, 96 Stat. 1409 (1982) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77–78 (1988))
(clarifying the jurisdiction of the SEC and the definition of security); see also Futures Trading Act
of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, 96 Stat. 2294 (1983) (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1–26 (1988); U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS, ISSUES RELATED TO THE
SHAD-JOHNSON JURISDICTIONAL ACCORD 5–6 (2000), http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/
gg00089.pdf.
84. See Esau, supra note 68, at 921–22; see also GREEN ET AL., supra note 73, at § 12.09.
85. See GREEN ET AL., supra note 73, at § 12.09.
86. See id. at § 12.10; see also Chi. Mercantile Exch. v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537, 549–50 (7th Cir.
1989) (opining that certain stock exchange index participation contracts more convincingly appear
to be futures contracts more convincingly than the secondary appearance of options on securities,
and are therefore subject to the jurisdiction of the CFTC).
87. See GREEN ET AL., supra note 73, at § 12.10.
88. Greenberger, supra note 66, at 132.
89. See id. at 133; see also Policy Statement Concerning Swap Transactions, 54 Fed. Reg.
30,694, 30,694 (July 21, 1989).
90. See GREEN ET AL., supra note 73, at § 12.10; Greenberger, supra note 66, at 133.
91. Greenberger, supra note 66, at 133–34 (citing Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992, Pub.
L. No. 102-546, § 502, 106 Stat. 3590 (1992) (codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.)); see also
GREEN ET AL., supra note 73, at § 12.10.
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to the market by vesting in the CFTC the authority to exempt a broad range of
novel derivative instruments from the exchange-trading requirement. 92
Congress further allayed any concern that remained from the 1989 CEA policy
statement by passing the Futures Trading Practices Act.93 Pursuant to its new
authority, the CFTC officially exempted swaps from regulation in 1993.94
Rapid growth followed in the OTC derivatives market. 95 Subsequently,
however, so did a number of large financial losses.96 For example, the largest
municipal default in U.S. history occurred in 1994 when Orange County,
California executives entered into interest rate swap transactions without
understanding the risk or consequences in the event interest rates were to rise
quickly (which is exactly what happened).97 The county lost approximately $1.6
billion and filed for bankruptcy.98 In the same year, two large corporations,
Gibson Greetings and Procter & Gamble, both clients of Bankers Trust, sued the
bank after the corporations lost significant amounts of money based on their
purchase of unregulated derivative products from the bank.99
The high-profile losses from unregulated derivative transactions prompted the
CFTC to promulgate a concept release in May 1998, calling into question
whether OTC derivatives should indeed be subject to the mandatory exchangetrading requirement of the CEA. 100 The CFTC found that most swap
transactions had become highly standardized and were being traded
multilaterally, thus subverting the intent of the safe harbor exemption for
swaps.101 The 1998 concept release prompted an immediate joint press release
from the Department of the Treasury, the Federal Reserve Board, and the SEC,
calling into doubt the scope of the CFTC’s jurisdiction.102

92.
93.
94.
95.

See GREEN ET AL., supra note 73, at § 12.11.
Greenberger, supra note 66, at 133.
See GREEN ET AL., supra note 73, at § 12.11(1).
See Eli M. Remolona, The Recent Growth of Financial Derivative Markets, 17 FED. RES.
BANK N.Y. Q. REV. 28, 30 (1992), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/
quarterly_review/1992v17/v17n4article2.pdf (stating that “[i]nterest rate swaps, the dominant OTC
derivative from the outset, grew an average of 41 percent a year in notional principal from 1986 to
1991 and alone accounted for possibly half of the absolute increase in total notional principal of all
OTC derivatives during the period”).
96. See Greenberger, supra note 66, at 137 (citing Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 63 Fed.
Reg. 26,114, 26,115 (May 12, 1998)).
97. Id. at 137–38.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 138.
100. Id. at 136.
101. Id.; see also 63 Fed. Reg. at 26,116 (explaining that “[t]o qualify for a safe harbor from
regulation . . . a swap agreement must have [among other things] individually tailored terms”).
102. Press Release, Joint Statement by Robert E. Rubin, Treasury Secretary, Alan Greenspan,
Federal Reserve Board Chairman, & Arthur Levitt, Chairman of the SEC (May 7, 1998), http://
www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/rr2426.aspx (stating that “[w]e seriously
question the scope of the CFTC’s jurisdiction in this area, and we are very concerned about reports

2015]

OTC Derivatives in a Global Financial Marketplace

375

In September 1998, just months after the publication of the concept release,
Long Term Capital Management, one of the largest and most successful hedge
funds at the time, nearly collapsed from losses sustained in OTC derivative
positions.103 Despite evidence that unregulated OTC derivatives were extremely
risky products that even sophisticated investors misunderstood, Congress,
seemingly influenced by senior officials at the Treasury Department, the SEC,
and the Federal Reserve Board, was more concerned with promoting innovation
and competition in the market and sought to formally keep those transactions
off-exchange and in the dark.104
In 1999, the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets submitted a
report to Congress recommending that OTC derivatives be completely
deregulated.105 The cover letter to the report explained the Working Group’s
reasoning for the recommendation, saying, “[a] cloud of legal uncertainty has
hung over the OTC derivatives markets in the United States in recent years,
which, if not addressed, could discourage innovation and growth of these
important markets and damage U.S. leadership in these arenas by driving
transactions off-shore.”106 It did not take long for Congress to react.
4. The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 Excludes OTC
Derivatives from Substantive Regulation
Congress, persuaded by the Working Group’s recommendation, passed the
Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA). 107 The CFMA
amended the CEA to exclude OTC derivatives from substantive regulation by
exempting “any agreement, contract or transaction that (i) involved a
nonagricultural commodity, (ii) was entered into solely between [eligible

that the CFTC’s action may increase the legal uncertainty concerning certain types of OTC
derivatives”).
103. See Greenberger, supra note 66, at 139; see also REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S WORKING
GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS 12–14 (1999), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/finmkts/Documents/otcact.pdf.
104. See Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L.
No. 105-277, § 760, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998) (enacting standstill legislation prohibiting the CFTC
from issuing any rule, regulation, interpretation, or policy statement that would restrict or regulate
swaps activity); see also Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 9, at 1420–24 (discussing views held by senior
government regulators in the 1990s to 2000s that minimized governmental interference to promote
innovation and competition in financial markets).
105. See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS 15–16,
supra note 103 (stating that “[t]he members of the Working Group agree that there is no compelling
evidence of problems involving bilateral swap agreements that would warrant regulation under the
CEA”).
106. Id.
107. Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1–27(f) (2012);
see also supra text accompanying notes 105–06 (explaining the findings of the President’s Working
Group on Financial Markets, as submitted to Congress).
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contract participants,108] and (iii) was not entered into or executed on a ‘trading
facility.’” 109 Further, the CFMA enabled certain qualifying OTC derivatives
transactions to be cleared 110 by a clearing organization 111 to ensure their
“eligibility for exclusion or exemption from CEA regulation.”112 Finally, the
CFMA lifted the ban on trading futures contracts on single securities and
narrow-based security indices established by the Shad-Johnson Accord.113
Due to the deregulatory effect of the CFMA, OTC derivatives were not
sufficiently monitored during the run-up to the financial crisis in 2008. 114
Regulators were stripped of their ability to monitor systemic risk or implement
appropriate prophylactic measures.115 Christopher Cox, former chairman of the
SEC, noted in October 2008 that the OTC derivatives market (in particular,
credit default swaps) had become a “regulatory black hole.”116
5. The Global Financial Crisis and Subsequent Regulatory Overhaul
The events of 2008 and the resulting fallout can best be described as a
culmination of a financial perfect storm. Deregulation to foster financial
innovation and promote competitiveness in an increasingly global marketplace,
coupled with lax lending standards to promote homeownership, led the United

108. See GREEN ET AL., supra note 73, at § 12.13(1); see also 7 U.S.C. § 1a(12) (2006)
(defining an “eligible contract participant”). Generally, an “eligible contract participant” is “[a]n
entity, such as a financial institution, an insurance company, or commodity pool, that is classified
by the CEA . . . based upon its regulated status or the amount it invests on a discretionary basis.”
CFTC Glossary, COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, http://www.cftc.gov/Consumer
Protection/EducationCenter/CFTCGlossary/index.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2016).
109. GREEN ET AL., supra note 73, at § 12.13(1); see also 7 U.S.C. § 1a(33)(A) (defining
“trading facility” as “a person or group of persons that constitutes, maintains, or provides a physical
or electronic facility or system in which multiple participants have the ability to execute or trade
agreements, contracts, or transactions by accepting bids and offers made by other participants that
are open to multiple participants in the facility or system”).
110. “Clearing” is “[t]he procedure through which the clearing organization becomes the buyer
to each seller of a futures contract or other derivative, and the seller to each buyer for clearing
members.” CFTC Glossary, supra note 108.
111. See 7 U.S.C. § 1a(9) (2012). A “clearing organization” is “[a]n entity through which
futures and other derivative transactions are cleared and settled.” CFTC Glossary, supra note 108.
“It is also charged with assuring the proper conduct of each contract’s delivery procedures and the
adequate financing of trading.” Id.
112. GREEN ET AL., supra note 73, at § 12.13(1).
113. See Gogel, supra note 52, at 27.
114. See THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 4, at 48–49.
115. See id. at 48 (stating that “[t]he CFMA effectively shielded OTC derivatives from
virtually all regulation or oversight”).
116. Christopher Cox, Chairman of the SEC, Opening Remarks at SEC Roundtable on
Modernizing the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Disclosure System (Oct. 8, 2008),
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/spch100808cc.htm (noting that the credit default swap
market “has grown between the gaps and seams of the current regulatory system, where neither the
[SEC] nor any other government agency can reach it”).
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States to experience its worst financial crisis since the Great Depression.117 The
collapse of Lehman Brothers and the subsequent bailout of AIG were like an
earthquake that rocked the financial landscape, the aftershocks of which were
felt around the world.118 Due to the globalization of the derivatives markets in
the 2000s, the effects of the 2008 economic collapse—unlike the financial crisis
of the 1990s119—finally convinced Congress of the need for proper regulation
of OTC derivatives.120
In July 2010, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act” or “Dodd-Frank”), which
effectively repealed much of the CFMA.121 In stark contrast to a decades-long
“light touch” approach,122 OTC derivatives were finally subject to much of the
same regulation that existed for other financial products and securities traded on
regulated exchanges.123
First, Dodd-Frank defines and distinguishes between “swaps” and “securitybased swaps.” 124 The CFTC retains jurisdiction over swaps, and the SEC
regulates security-based swaps.125 To the extent any product exhibits features
of both a swap and a security-based swap (i.e., a “mixed swap”126), it will be
regulated jointly by the CFTC and the SEC.127 Dodd-Frank further imposes
similar requirements on both swaps and security-based swaps, including, among

117. See THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 4, at xv, 443 (describing the 2008
financial crisis as “the greatest financial crisis since the Great Depression”).
118. See Susanne Craig et al., AIG, Lehman Shock Hits World Markets, WALL. ST. J. (Sept.
16, 2008, 11:59 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB122152314746339697 (stating that “the
convulsions in the U.S. financial system sent markets across the globe tumbling”).
119. See Two Financial Crises Compared: The Savings and Loan Debacle and the Mortgage
Mess, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/04/14/business/
20110414-prosecute.html (comparing the U.S. government’s responses to the savings and loan
crisis and the 2008 financial crisis); supra notes 97–113 and accompanying text.
120. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5301
(2012) (stating the purpose of the Act is “[t]o promote the financial stability of the United States
by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system”); see also Derivatives, SEC,
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/derivatives.shtml (last visited Nov. 25, 2014) (explaining
that “Title VII of Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act addresses the gap
in U.S. financial regulation of OTC swaps by providing a comprehensive framework for the
regulation of the OTC swaps markets”).
121. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2012) (to be codified in scattered sections of the
U.S. Code); see also Derivatives, supra note 120.
122. See Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 9, at 1393.
123. See Marc A. Horwitz, Dodd-Frank Act Aims To Fundamentally Change Trading of OTC
Derivatives, DLA PIPER (Jul. 26, 2010), http://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/
2010/07/doddfrank-act-aims-to-fundamentally-change-tradi__/ (stating that the Dodd-Frank Act
“contains a sweeping overhaul of the regulation of over-the-counter derivatives markets”).
124. See § 761, 124 Stat. at 1756 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78c (2012)).
125. § 712, 124 Stat. at 1641 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 8302 (2012)).
126. Id. at 1642.
127. Id.
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other things, registration of dealers and major participants, exchange trading,
clearing, and trade reporting.128
a. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Considering the global nature of the OTC derivatives market, Congress
specifically contemplated that certain provisions of Dodd-Frank may need to
apply to foreign counterparties in cross-border transactions.129 The applicable
statutory provisions provide that if there is a “direct and significant connection
with activities in, or effect on, commerce of the United States,”130 or if a person
transacting business in swaps or securities-based swaps acts in contravention of
rules or regulations promulgated by the CFTC or the SEC designed to prevent
evasion of Dodd-Frank, such person or transaction will come under the
jurisdiction of U.S. law.131 Congress also provided explicit authority for the
Commissions to consult and coordinate with foreign regulators to implement
consistency in global derivatives regulation.132
The language in Dodd-Frank addressing the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the
SEC was the direct result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison v.
National Australia Bank Ltd. 133 In Morrison, the Court announced that the
Exchange Act did not “reach[] conduct in this country affecting exchanges or
transactions abroad,”134 and the antifraud provisions applied “only in connection
with the purchase or sale of a security listed on an American stock exchange,
and the purchase or sale of any other security in the United States.”135
Commissioner Kara Stein noted at the open commission meeting adopting
some of the SEC’s cross-border rules that “Section 929P of the Dodd-Frank Act
explicitly grants the Commission the power to protect American markets and
people” and “was enacted just days after the Morrison decision.” 136 The
relevant statute states:
(c) EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION.—The district courts of
the United States and the United States courts of any Territory shall
have jurisdiction of an action or proceeding brought or instituted by
128. Id. at 1641–42 (noting that the SEC and the CFTC are required to regulate swaps and
security-based swaps in the same manner).
129. See § 929P, 124 Stat. at 1864 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77v (2012)).
130. § 722(d), 124 Stat. at 1673 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2 (2012)).
131. See § 772, 124 Stat. at 1802.
132. See § 752, 124 Stat. at 1749–50.
133. 561 U.S. 247, 267–68 (2010); see also Richard W. Painter, The Dodd-Frank
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Provision: Was It Effective, Needed or Sufficient?, 1 HARV. BUS. L. J.
195, 199 (2011) (explaining that “Congress responded to Morrison with statutory language directed
at cases brought by the SEC and DOJ”).
134. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 269.
135. Id. at 273.
136. Press Release, Kara M. Stein, Commissioner, SEC, Cross-Border Security-Based Swap
Rules and Guidance (June 25, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/PublicStmt/Detail/PublicStmt/
1370542555426.
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the Commission or the United States alleging a violation of Section
17(a) involving—
(1) conduct within the United States that constitutes
significant steps in furtherance of the violation, even if the
securities transaction occurs outside the United States and
involves only foreign investors; or
(2) conduct occurring outside the United States that has a
foreseeable substantial effect within the United States.137
b. Substituted Compliance and Equivalence
One of the most innovative aspects of Dodd-Frank is its adoption of a
regulatory approach allowing certain market participants to substitute
compliance with a foreign jurisdiction’s regulatory regime in place of DoddFrank.138 The CFTC and SEC have issued guidance and proposed rulemaking
that outlines their respective approaches to implementing a substituted
compliance framework. 139 Similarly, in the European Union, the European
Securities Markets Authority (ESMA) has proposed a framework for issuing
“equivalence” determinations for third-countries as a way to substitute
compliance with European Market Infrastructure Regulation.140
i. CFTC Final Guidance
The CFTC issued its final interpretive guidance and policy statement outlining
its process for substituted compliance determinations on July 26, 2013.141 The
CFTC stated that it seeks to achieve an “outcomes-based” approach by
reviewing the foreign jurisdiction’s rules for comparability to Dodd-Frank, but
it does not require a foreign jurisdiction’s rules to be identical.142 In issuing a
comparability determination, the CFTC states it
will take into consideration all relevant factors, including but not
limited to, the comprehensiveness of [the foreign jurisdiction’s]
requirement(s), the scope and objectives of the relevant regulatory
requirement(s), the comprehensiveness of the foreign regulator’s

137. § 929P, 124 Stat. at 1864.
138. See Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities, 78 Fed. Reg. 31,085 (May 23, 2013)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242, and 249).
139. See Interpretive Guidance, 78 Fed. Reg. 45,292, 45,340–46 (July 26, 2013) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. ch. 1); see also Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities, 78 Fed. Reg. at 31,085–
101.
140. See EUR. SEC. & MKT. AUTH., ESMA DELIVERS SECOND SET OF ADVICE ON EMIR
EQUIVALENCE (Feb. 10, 2013), http://www.esma.europa.eu/news/ESMA-delivers-second-setadvice-EMIR-equivalence.
141. See Interpretive Guidance, 78 Fed. Reg. at 45,340.
142. Id. at 45,342–43.
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supervisory compliance program, as well as the home jurisdiction’s
authority to support and enforce its oversight of the registrant.143
The comparability analysis will be based on comparison of thirteen categories:
five “entity-level” and eight “transaction-level” requirements.144 On December
20, 2013, the CFTC approved comparability determinations for six
jurisdictions.145 The CFTC worked with authorities and market participants in
each jurisdiction to issue the determinations.146 Australia, Canada, the European
Union, Hong Kong, Japan, and Switzerland were deemed comparable with
respect to certain entity-level requirements.147 Additionally, the EU and Japan
were deemed comparable for certain transaction-level requirements.148
ii. The SEC’s Proposed Cross-Border Rules
The SEC’s approach to issuing comparability determinations for substituted
compliance is similar to the CFTC’s approach.149 The SEC proposed a rule that
would allow international market participants “engaged in conduct that the
statutory provision regulates” the ability to comply with the SEC’s securitybased swap rules through “substituted compliance,” a concept wherein
satisfaction of foreign law the SEC has deemed to be comparable to the SEC’s
security-based swap rules complies with U.S. regulations.150 According to the
143. Id. at 45,343.
144. Id. at 45,344.
145. Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Approves
Comparability Determinations for Six Jurisdictions for Substituted Compliance Purposes (Dec. 20,
2013), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6802-13.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities, 78 Fed. Reg. at 30,975 (characterizing
the SEC’s proposed approach as “focus[ed] on regulatory outcomes rather than a rule-by-rule
comparison”); see also supra notes 145–46 and accompany text.
150. See Application of “Security-Based Swap Dealer” and “Major Security-Based Swap
Participant” Definitions to Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities, Release No. 34-72472,
79 Fed. Reg. 39,067, 39,147 (July 9, 2014) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 241, and 250);
DAVIS, POLK & WARDWELL, CLIENT MEMORANDUM, SEC ADOPTS SECURITY-BASED SWAP
CROSS-BORDER DEFINITION RULE 5 (July 3, 2014), http://www.davispolk.com/sites/default/files/
07.03.14.SEC_.Adopts.Security.Based_.Swap_.Cross_.Border.Definitional.Rule_.pdf. However,
“[t]he SEC did not address in the new rule the provisions from the proposed rule defining when
substituted compliance may be used, but provides a process through which market participants and
foreign regulators will be able to petition the SEC for a substituted compliance order.” DAVIS,
POLK & WARDWELL, supra, at 5. Nevertheless, “[t]he SEC plans to adopt provisions regarding the
situations in which substituted compliance may be used for each substantive Title VII rule as part
of each relevant substantive rule.” Id. Since the SEC has not yet adopted every proposed rule, it
has not yet addressed every situation in which substituted compliance would be available.
Application of “Security-Based Swap Dealer” and “Major Security-Based Swap Participant”
Definitions to Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities, 79 Fed. Reg. at 39,068 (“The
Commission is not addressing, as part of this release, certain other rules that we proposed regarding
the application of Subtitle B of Title VII in the cross-border context.”).
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proposal, the SEC will look to four separate categories of requirements.151 If the
SEC determines that regulatory outcomes are comparable in three out of the four
required categories, it would permit substituted compliance with those three
categories.152 The four categories to be considered by the SEC include:
(i) Requirements applicable to registered security-based swap dealers
in Section 15F of the Exchange Act and the rules and regulations
thereunder; (ii) requirements relating to regulatory reporting and
public dissemination of information on security-based swaps; (iii)
requirements relating to clearing for security-based swaps; and (iv)
requirements relating to trade execution for security-based swaps.153
Similar to the CFTC, the SEC states that it will take a “holistic approach” that
“focus[es] on regulatory outcomes rather than a rule-by-rule comparison.”154
However, the proposal does not identify with any particularity how it will
evaluate a foreign jurisdiction’s regulatory regime to determine if it is
comparable. For example, in making substituted compliance determinations, the
SEC states it will do so
only if we find that the requirements of such foreign financial
regulatory system are comparable to otherwise applicable
requirements, taking into account factors that the Commission
determines appropriate, such as, for example, the scope and objectives
of the relevant foreign regulatory requirements, as well as the
effectiveness of the supervisory compliance program administered,
and the enforcement authority exercised, by a foreign financial
regulatory authority or authorities in such system to support its
oversight of such foreign security-based swap dealer (or any class
thereof).155
iii. The European Markets and Infrastructure Regulation
The European Union has taken a very similar approach to derivatives
regulation. The principal legislation, the European Markets and Infrastructure
Regulation (EMIR), 156 allows the European Commission, pursuant to advice
from the European Markets and Securities Authority (ESMA), to issue
“equivalency” determinations much like the ability of both the CFTC and the
SEC to issue substituted compliance determinations. 157 ESMA, in its final
report on technical advice on third country equivalence, states that the European
Commission should follow an “objective-based approach, where the capability
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 31,085.
154. Id. at 30,975; see supra notes 143, 149 and accompanying text.
155. Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities, 78 Fed. Reg. at 30,975.
156. Regulation (EU) 648/2012, 2012 O.J. (L 201) 1 (commonly referred to as the “European
Market Infrastructure Regulation” or “EMIR”).
157. Id. at (L 201) 2.
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of the regime in the third country to meet the objectives of the EU Regulation is
assessed from a holistic perspective.” 158 The European Commission will
consider equivalence for the United States by evaluating three specific areas: (i)
central counterparties, 159 (ii) trade repositories, 160 and (iii) “potentially
duplicative or conflicting requirements regarding the clearing obligation,
reporting obligation, non-financial counterparties and risk-mitigation techniques
for OTC derivative contracts not cleared by a [central counterparty].”161
II. ANALYSIS OF COMPARABILITY DETERMINATIONS FOR SUBSTITUTED
COMPLIANCE AND HARMONIZATION EFFORTS ON IMPLEMENTATION
Although the CFTC stated it would take an “outcomes-based” approach,162
the comparability determinations issued by the Commission appear to take a
rule-by-rule analysis. Commissioner Scott O’Malia, dissenting from the
approval of the comparability determinations, stated that “[i]f the Commission’s
objective for substituted compliance is to develop a narrow rule-by-rule
approach that leaves unanswered major regulatory gaps between our regulatory
framework and foreign jurisdictions, then I believe that the Commission has
successfully achieved its goal today.”163
As discussed above, the implementing rules and legislation for OTC
derivatives reform are very similar for both the United States and the European
Union.164 Despite efforts for harmonization, however, the European Union has
lagged far behind the United States in addressing meaningful reform. While the
European Markets Infrastructure Regulation is indeed the principal European
legislation addressing clearing and reporting OTC derivatives, two more recent
pieces of legislation were passed in order to meet the G20 commitments.165 The
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II) addresses trading
(which does not take effect until 2017),166 and the Market Abuse Regulation

158. EUR. SEC. & MKT. AUTH., FINAL REPORT: TECHNICAL ADVICE ON THIRD COUNTRY
REGULATORY EQUIVALENCE UNDER EMIR-US 5 (Sept. 1, 2013), http://www.esma.europa.eu/
content/Technical-advice-third-country-regulatory-equivalence-under-EMIR-%E2%80%93-US.
159. A central counterparty may be recognized by ESMA if it complies with similarly legally
binding requirements to those of EMIR, it is supervised in the third party country, and it is subject
to a similar legal framework in that third party country. See id. at 6–7.
160. A trade repository from a third country may also be recognized by ESMA if the third
country imposes a similar legal framework to EMIR. See id. at 7.
161. See id. at 6.
162. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
163. Comparability Determinations, 78 Fed. Reg. 78,839, 78,851 (Dec. 27, 2013).
164. See supra Part I.D.5.a–b.
165. Press Release, Eur. Securities & Market Authority, ESMA Readies MiFID II, MAR and
CSDR (Sept. 28, 2015), https://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/2015-1466_press_release_-_
final_mifid_ii_mar_csdr_0.pdf.
166. Id.
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addresses manipulation of foreign exchange rates and other enforcement
issues.167
In contrast, Dodd-Frank covers each of the G20 commitments, 168 and the
CFTC largely completes its mandatory rulemakings pursuant thereunder. 169
While the SEC is working its way diligently toward completing its Dodd-Frank
rulemaking requirements,170 the Commission is also involved largely with other
rulemaking determinations pursuant to the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act
of 2012. 171 If the CFTC and SEC are to make any meaningful substituted
compliance determinations with respect to the European Union, it is difficult, if
not impossible, to do so without any comparable legislation to consider.
Accordingly, the Financial Stability Board, in its most recent progress report on
OTC derivatives reforms, states that it “continues to urge [foreign] jurisdictions
to promptly put in place any remaining legislation and regulation in a form
flexible enough to respond to cross-border consistency.”172 Further, coordinated
regulations in key areas would reduce the appeal for regulatory arbitrage. 173
Some scholars, however, argue that complete harmonization across the G20
jurisdictions to create a single global regulatory regime could increase, rather
than decrease, systemic risk.174
III. THE CASE FOR COMPATIBLE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS AND UNIFORM
GLOBAL IDENTIFIERS
While substituted compliance and equivalence are steps in the right direction
in order to achieve global regulatory reform of OTC derivatives, part of the
success depends on compatible reporting requirements and uniformity of data.
To illustrate the need for uniform global swap trade data reporting, recall the
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers that precipitated the crisis. 175 At the time
Lehman collapsed, “regulators and private sector managers were unable to
assess quickly and fully the extent of market participants’ exposure to Lehman
and how the vast network of market participants were connected to one
167. Id.
168. See Kubas, supra note 12.
169. See discussion supra Part I.D.5.b.i.
170. See discussion supra Part I.D.5.b.ii.
171. See Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 201(a), 126 Stat. 306, 313 (April 5, 2012) (codified at 15
U.S.C. 77d(a) (2012)).
172. FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 12, at 33.
173. See Regulatory Arbitrage, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/regula
tory-arbitrage.asp (last visited Jan. 30, 2016) (defining “regulatory arbitrage” as “[a] practice
whereby firms capitalize on loopholes in regulatory systems in order to circumvent unfavorable
regulation”).
174. See, e.g., Griffith, supra note 26, at 1356 (stating that “uniform financial regulation can
contribute to systemic risk by causing the behavior of regulated institutions to converge on similar
business strategies” leading to “destructive coordination”).
175. See Legal Entity Identifier—Frequently Asked Questions, OFF. FIN. RES., http://financial
research.gov/data/legal-entity-identifier-faqs/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2015).
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another.”176 The global financial crisis that followed “underscored the need for
a global system to identify financial connections.”177
A. Compatible Data Reporting Requirements and Uniform Global Identifiers
Regulators issuing substituted compliance or equivalency determinations
should primarily focus on whether a foreign jurisdiction’s swap reporting data
is compatible with the regulators’ existing systems. Issuing substituted
compliance in swap data reporting is of great importance as it allows a swap
dealer to comply with only one set of rules, thus reducing redundant or
duplicative obligations. Indeed, both the United States and European Union
allow for a substituted compliance or equivalency determination for swap data
reporting.178 However, to make sharing of swap transaction data meaningful,
regulators worldwide should adopt the recommendation of the International
Swaps and Derivatives Association and implement “internationally compatible
reporting systems so that cross-border . . . swaps would not have to be reported
twice.”179
Indeed, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) identified implementation issues
in trade reporting, noting “authorities continue to report . . . inconsistencies in
data fields and formats across [trade repositories].”180 However, the FSB notes
that “a number of international workstreams are currently in place” and “cover
a wide range of considerations including . . . standardi[z]ation of transaction and
product identifiers to help support more consistency in data.”181 Continuing in
the right direction, the FSB also states that it “will work with [the Committee of
Payments and Market Infrastructures] and [the International Organization of
Securities Commissions] to provide official sector impetus and coordination for
the further development and implementation of uniform global [unique
transaction identifiers] and [unique product identifiers].”182 The FSB further
advocates for, and is progressing towards, implementing a global legal entity
identifier system. 183 Using global unique identifiers for transaction, product,
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities, 78 Fed. Reg. 31,085 (May 23, 2013)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242, and 249); Press Release, European Commission, First
“Equivalence” Decisions for Central Counterparty Regulatory Regimes Adopted Today (Oct. 30,
2014), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-1228_en.htm?locale=en.
179. Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities, 78 Fed. Reg. at 31,092.
180. FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 12, at 26.
181. Id. at 28.
182. Id. The International Swaps and Derivatives Association has led the way in developing
uniform data reporting standards and formats. See Data and Reporting, INT’L SWAPS &
DERIVATIVES ASS’N, http://www2.isda.org/functional-areas/technology-infrastructure/data-andreporting/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2015)..
183. See FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 12, at 29; see also Legal Entity Identifier—Frequently
Asked Questions, supra note 175 (explaining that an LEI is “a reference code . . . to uniquely
identify a legally distinct entity that engages in a financial transaction”).
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and legal entity reporting will provide for valuable risk management and assist
in responding to weaknesses in the global financial system.
IV. CONCLUSION
The previously unregulated OTC derivatives market has undergone vast
reforms since the global financial crisis of 2008. A global coordinated effort is
necessary to achieve meaningful regulatory reform. The United States and
European Union, in seeking to make substituted compliance and equivalency
determinations, should focus on creating a uniform data format in swap data
sharing. An internationally compatible reporting system and adoption of global
swap data identifiers, such as the unique identifiers promoted by the Financial
Stability Board,184 should be implemented to allow regulators to monitor and
evaluate global systemic risk. To the extent possible, regulators should seek to
harmonize their approaches and timelines to achieving OTC derivatives
regulatory reform in an effort to reduce regulatory arbitrage.

184. See generally FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 12.
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